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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Dawn Marie Orr appeals from her judgment and conviction for five counts of 
grand theft by embezzlement. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
During the summer of 2014, accountants at the College of Southern Idaho 
recognized some large discrepancies in their accounts.  (Tr., p.7, Ls.1-22.)  They began 
an internal investigation to reconcile the accounts.  (Tr., p.7, L.23 – p.10, L.15.)  On July 
30, Orr came into her supervisor’s office to complain that she was being unfairly treated 
and felt that she might have a nervous breakdown.  (Tr., p.10, L.16 – p.11, L.18.)  She 
was invited to go home and talk to someone.  (Tr., p.11, Ls.19-23.)  No one at that time 
suspected that Orr had stolen the money.  (Tr., p.11, L.24 – p.12, L.4.) 
The following day, Orr met with administrators at the College of Southern Idaho 
and indicated that she had stolen between $50,000.00 and $100,000.00.  (PSI, p.3.)  
Orr considerably underestimated her theft.  A later investigation revealed that from 2008 
through 2014, Orr had embezzled at least $677,735.58 from the College of Southern 
Idaho.  (PSI, p.5.)  The state charged Orr with five counts of grand theft, one count per 
year, for embezzlements occurring between 2010 and 2014.  (R., pp.70-72.)  Pursuant 
to a plea agreement, Orr pleaded guilty to the charges.  (R., pp.79, 125.)  The district 
court entered judgment against Orr and sentenced her to 14 years with 10 years fixed 
on the first count of grand theft, and consecutive sentences of 14 years indeterminate 
on each of the remaining counts, for a total unified sentence of 70 years with 10 years 




Orr states the issues on appeal as: 
 
A. The Prosecutor breached the plea agreement by impliedly 
disavowing and expressing reservation about the sentencing 
recommendation set forth in the plea agreement. 
 
B. The District Court abused its discretion in imposing an excessive 
and unduly harsh sentence that was unsupported by the facts in the 
record…. 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p.2.) 
 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
 
1. Has Orr failed to show fundamental error entitling her to review of her claim that 
the prosecutor breached the plea agreement? 
 






Orr Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error Entitling Her To Review Of Her Claim That 
The Prosecutor Breached The Plea Agreement 
 
A. Introduction 
Below, the state and Orr entered into a plea agreement under which, among 
other things, the state agreed to limit its sentencing recommendation to concurrent 
terms of 14 years with five years fixed on the multiple counts of embezzlement.  (R., 
p.79.)  As part of his argument in support of the sentencing recommendation, the 
prosecutor relied on Orr’s prior criminal conduct involving multiple counts of forgery.  In 
making that argument, the prosecutor acknowledged that, because that criminal 
conduct had been resolved through a withheld judgment, he “quite frankly, was not 
aware of the [1993] convictions until [he] saw the PSI, and [he] went back and looked at 
the NCIC and looked and could not see where there’s any indication that she had been 
charged with those forgery counts.”  (Tr., p.27, Ls.12-15.)  The state went on to note 
that Orr’s 
prior record, her actions in this case, all point to the State’s 
recommendation being as a reasonable recommendation, that it 
addresses the good order and protection of society to protect others from 
the criminal conduct by this defendant, and while—and I shared this with 
Mr. McRae earlier, that we had discussed in the office whether, based on 
what we had learned from the PSI, whether we should change any 
recommendation to the Court.  The State decided that the 
recommendation of the 14 years, five fixed, with nine years indeterminate, 
is appropriate, and that’s what we stand by in this case, but that she 
should serve that in prison and that the counts should run concurrently. 
 
(Tr., p.27, L.16 – p.28, L.4.) 
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Now, for the first time on appeal, despite the prosecutor specifically affirming the 
agreed upon sentencing recommendation, Orr claims that the prosecutor’s statements 
constitute a breach of the plea agreement.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-5.)  Review of the 
record, however, shows that Orr has failed to show error, much less fundamental error 
entitling her to review of this unpreserved issue. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
Absent a timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only review an 
alleged error under the fundamental error doctrine.  State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226, 
245 P.3d 961, 978 (2010). 
 
C. The Prosecutor Did Not Breach The Plea Agreement 
For the first time on appeal, Orr asserts that the prosecutor breached the plea 
agreement by, she alleges, expressing reservations and impliedly disavowing the 
state’s sentencing recommendations.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-5.)  Because she did not 
preserve this issue below, she is required to show fundamental error on appeal.  Perry, 
150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.  To establish fundamental error, 
the defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that the 
alleged error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant’s unwaived 
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional 
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as 
to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not 
harmless. 
 
Id. at 228, 245 P.3d at 980.  Because review of the record shows that the prosecutor’s 
argument did not repudiate the parties’ plea agreement, Orr has failed to show error, 
much less fundamental error entitling her to review of this unpreserved claim. 
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The plea agreement specifically allowed the prosecutor to (1) “argue … the facts 
of the dismissed case(s) and/or unfiled charge(s) in aggravation at sentencing” and to 
(2) alter its sentencing recommendation if “[t]he defendant has additional juvenile or 
adult convictions beyond those provided in discovery in the NCIC report, juvenile 
history, and driving record.”  (R., p.79.)  As explained by the prosecutor, after reviewing 
the PSI, he discovered the earlier forgery charges and conviction.  (Tr., p.27, Ls.9-15; 
see also PSI, p.10.)1  Orr does not dispute that this was new or additional information 
previously unknown to the state.  As shown above, the prosecutor acknowledged the 
discovery of Orr’s prior criminal conduct, and then asked the district court to follow the 
sentencing recommendation notwithstanding that new and additional information.  (See 
Tr., p.27, L.16 – p.28, L.4.)  That is not a breach of the plea agreement. 
Furthermore, even if the prosecutor’s comments could conceivably be read as 
“impliedly” repudiating the plea agreement, as Orr suggests (see Appellant’s brief, p.3), 
the prosecutor’s statement certainly does not clearly repudiate the plea agreement, 
which is what fundamental error requires.  Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. 
Orr has failed to show error in this case.  She has therefore necessarily failed to 
show fundamental error entitling her to review of this issue for the first time on appeal.  
Orr’s conviction and sentence for five counts of grand theft should be affirmed. 
 
                                            
1  While Orr was granted a withheld judgment on her two forgery charges, (PSI, p.10), 
withheld judgments are convictions.  See United States v. Sharp, 145 Idaho 403, 404-




Orr Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of The District Court’s Sentencing Discretion 
 
A. Introduction 
Orr argues that, in light of allegedly mitigating factors, the district court abused its 
discretion by imposing a unified term of 14 years with 10 years fixed on her first count of 
grand theft, and consecutive indeterminate sentences of 14 years on each subsequent 
count, for a total unified sentence of 70 years with 10 years fixed.  (Appellant’s brief, 
pp.5-12.)  Orr has failed to establish an abuse of the district court’s sentencing 
discretion. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
“Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.”  State v. Moore, 
131 Idaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998) (citing State v. Wersland, 125 Idaho 499, 
873 P.2d 144 (1994)). 
 
C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Imposing Five Consecutive 14 
Year Sentences, With Only The First 10 Years Fixed, On Orr’s Convictions 
 
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant is required to establish 
that the sentence is a clear abuse of discretion.  State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 
P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)).  To 
carry this burden, Orr must show that her sentence is excessive under any reasonable 
view of the facts.  Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d at 615.  A sentence is reasonable if 
appropriate to achieve the primary objective of protecting society, and any or all of the 
related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.  State v. Wolfe, 99 
Idaho 382, 384, 582 P.2d 728, 730 (1978).  While the Court reviews the whole sentence 
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on appeal, it presumes that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant’s 
probable term of confinement.  State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 
(2007).  In deference to the trial judge, the Court will not substitute its view of a 
reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ.  State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 
565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). 
In imposing sentence, the district court carefully weighed the statutory factors set 
forth in Idaho Code § 19-2521.  (Tr., p.41, L.2 – p.48, L.24.)  The district court weighed 
the Toohill policy factors.  (Tr., p.49, L.1 – p.50, L.7.)  And the district court considered 
the nature of Orr’s offense and her history of criminality.  (See Tr., p.44, Ls.13-19; p.45, 
Ls.12-20; p.48, Ls.16-24.)  The district court recognized, in light of Orr’s arguments that 
the College of Southern Idaho bore some responsibility for her embezzlements because 
they failed to supervise her, Orr had not really accepted responsibility for the 
seriousness of her wrongdoing.  (Tr., p.42, L.25 – p.43, L.21.)  The district court 
concluded that Orr’s crime was “outrageous” and explained: 
It is an affront to this community, it is the most—one of the most serious 
offenses I have seen as a judge while I have sat on the bench in this case.  
The conduct mandates a severe punishment for the good order and 
protection of society.  It will give the Idaho State Department of 
Corrections [sic] the rest of your natural life to monitor you.  I think you’ll 
make parole someday.  But I want that board of corrections to have the 
power to immediately, immediately reimpose the balance of that sentence 
if you as much as flinch in terms of criminal conduct.  It will also give the 
Idaho State Board of Corrections [sic] and the parole board the ability to 
monitor you for the rest of your natural life, to collect the restitution that will 
be ordered in this case…. 
 
(Tr., p.51, L.21 – p.52, L.9.) 
On appeal, Orr argues that “the Court attempts to paint a picture of Ms. Orr as a 
persistent violator and repeat offender but such a classification is not supported by the 
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record.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp.7-8.)  Contrary to Orr’s claims, such a classification is 
supported by the record.  For at least seven years, she repeatedly embezzled from her 
employer, the College of Southern Idaho.  (See PSI, pp.4-5.)  The school only keeps the 
financial records for seven years, and a reasonable inference could be made that the 
embezzlement lasted much longer.  And Orr had previously embezzled from an 
employer in her “forgery” case, which involved her writing out checks to herself on the 
company’s account.  (See PSI, p.10.) 
Orr argues that the district court’s classification of Orr as a “professional criminal” 
was unsupported by the record.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.8-10.)  In fact, once again, that 
classification is fully supported by the record.  An investigation revealed that in 2014, 
Orr embezzled $137,535.50 from the college; in 2013 she embezzled $102,858.50; in 
2012 she embezzled $129,335.80; in 2011 she embezzled $100,694.49; in 2010 she 
embezzled $71,248.58; in 2009 she embezzled $81,190.71; in 2008 she embezzled 
$54,872.00.  (PSI, p.5.)  For at least seven years, a substantial part of Orr’s annual 
income—if not the lion’s share—was derived from embezzlement.  The district court’s 
classification of Orr as a professional criminal is supported by the record. 
Orr argues that the district court failed to acknowledge in mitigation her mental 
health disorders and a gambling addiction, and her efforts to address those issues.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp.10-11.)  In fact the district court did note that those things could be 
considered provocations to commit the crime.  (Tr., p.42, Ls.8-11.)  But, as the court 
noted, Orr could have addressed these problems before she got caught (Tr., p.42, 
Ls.12-18), and they certainly do not outweigh the seriousness of Orr’s offense. 
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Finally, Orr argues that the district court incorrectly categorized embezzlement as 
the “absolute worst of the theft offenses.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp.11-12.)  Orr instead 
contends that the legislature has decided that extortion is worse than embezzlement.  
(Id.)  Of course, the district court’s statement was clearly phrased as an opinion, not a 
legal fact; and it was a well-supported opinion.  In her truncated version of the district 
court’s statement (see Appellant’s brief, pp.11-12), Orr omits the court’s rationale: 
[Embezzlement] is, in my view, the absolute worst of the theft offenses 
that can occur in this country, and the reason for that is exactly what has 
happened in this case.  Embezzlement occurs, in my view, in 99 percent 
of every embezzlement case because of trust between employer and 
employee, and that’s exactly what happened here.  Exactly what 
happened here.  You know it, and you took advantage of it. 
 
(Tr., p.47, Ls.10-16.)  Orr has failed to show an abuse of the court’s discretion. 
The district court properly exercised its discretion when it sentenced Orr to a total 
unified sentence of 70 years with 10 years fixed on her five convictions for grand theft 
by embezzlement.  Because Orr has failed to show that her sentence is excessive, she 
has failed to show an abuse of the court’s discretion.  Her sentence should be affirmed. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Orr’s conviction and 
sentence for five counts of grand theft. 




      _/s/ Russell J. Spencer _ 
      RUSSELL J. SPENCER 
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